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Unchain My Heart: Slavery as a Defense to the
Dismantling of the Violence Against Women Act
Angie Perone*
I. INTRODUCTION
Violence against women is a pervasive societal problem whose
importance has consistently been ignored or belittled by the courts. Courts
have historically minimized the effect of violence against women' and
continue to do so.2 Attempts to protect women from gender-motivated
violence have been held unconstitutional.3  Despite persuasive
* J.D., Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2006; B.A.,
2003, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. I would like to thank all the people who
provided assistance with my article including Elizabeth Kristen, Ross Wantland, and
Professor Vikram Amar, as well as the editorial board and staff of the Hastings Women's
Law Journal. But, most of all, I would like to recognize the brave women in my life who
have personally encountered domestic violence and unchained their hearts to freedom or are
on their way to releasing their chains. I also want to remind other courageous survivors of
domestic violence that you do not stand alone. If you or someone you know needs help,
there are resources available that can be accessed by calling places like the National
Domestic Violence Hotline at 1-800-799-SAFE (7233), the National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence at 202-745-1211, the National Battered Women's Law Project at 212-
741-9480, and the National Network to End Domestic Violence at 202-543-5566.
1. See e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156 (1824), overruled by Harris v.
State, 71 Miss. 462, 14 So. 266 (1893); State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1973) (stating
that "if no permanent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence
shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, and leave the
parties to forget and forgive.").
2. See e.g., State v. Compton, 153 Ohio App. 3d 512, 515, 2003-Ohio-4080, 794
N.E.2d 771, 773 (2003) (reversing an already meager trial court judgment that found the
defendant guilty of merely disorderly conduct when during an argument with his wife he
began driving toward her with his truck while yelling "[g]et out of the way, bitch, or I'll
drive you down with the car." (the defendant's justification for backing his car toward her
was to avoid striking her)). Id. See also State v. Cobb, 153 Ohio App. 3d 541, 544, 2003-
Ohio-3821, 795 N.E.2d 73, 75 (2003) (reversing defendant's domestic violence conviction
because the couple was not cohabiting and only engaged in "a sporadic provision of money
and conjugal relations" even though they had lived together.for the past nine months of their
fifteen-month relationship).
3. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000) (striking down 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981, which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gender-motivated
violence).
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congressional findings in support of the civil rights remedy, this provision
of the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") was invalidated.5
Nevertheless, this blow has not silenced the voices of the many women
who have been affected by domestic violence. With reauthorization of the
VAWA quickly approaching, 6 the time has arrived to reinvigorate the civil
rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act. This is not completely
unwarranted, especially in light of recent changes in the treatment of
domestic violence.7 For example, women have increasingly begun to sue
their perpetrators of domestic violence in state courts for tort remedies.8
While such state victories are extremely important for victims of domestic
violence, it is imperative that the federal system create a space for women
to assert their right to be free from gender-based violence. The 13th
Amendment provides Congress with a vehicle to accomplish that goal
through the VAWA.
Invoking the 13th Amendment to reinvigorate the civil rights remedy is
important because this remedy is but one part of a vital piece of legislation
that aims to ameliorate conditions of gender-motivated violence. Congress
passed the first version of the Violence Against Women Act in 1994.9 This
Act moved issues of domestic violence and sexual assault from the private
realm to the public sphere.10 The VAWA increased penalties for federal
rape convictions. It provided state grants to assist law enforcement and
educational efforts to reduce violence against women. This Act
specifically provided money to educate judges who consider cases of
domestic violence and sexual assault, and it encouraged circuit judicial
councils to conduct gender bias studies. 1 The VAWA guaranteed that
each state would recognize protective orders of another state. The VAWA
4. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (amended 2005).
5. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
6. The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 2005 passed the Senate by
unanimous consent on Tuesday, Oct. 4, 2005. S, 1197, 109th Cong. (2005). While the
House voted (415-4) on Sept. 28, 2005 to approve the VAWA as part of the Department of
Justice Authorization Act, H.R. 3402, 109th Cong. (2005), the Senate version is different,
and these differences must still be resolved by Congress before the ultimate version of the
VAWA is adopted.
7. In fact, recently, Patti Lumpkins won the largest domestic violence settlement
in Arizona state history, which amounted to $1.25 million. Donna Rescorla, Largest
Domestic Violence Settlement in State History, THE INDEPENDENT, available at
www.neveragainfoundation.org/news_patti.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2005).
8. See generally Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 121
(2001).
9. Violence Against Women Act, tit. 4, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
10. See generally Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of
Privacy, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2000) (emphasizing that "the personal is political" and
examining the importance of the VAWA's public recognition of traditionally private issues).
11. Johanna R. Shargel, In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act, 106 YALE L.J. 1850-51 (1997).
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also made reforms to immigration laws to protect battered immigrant
women. It amended the Federal Rules of Evidence to restrict admissibility
of a victim's sexual history in civil and criminal cases.12 Of course, the
most controversial provision of the Violence Against Women Act was the
inclusion of a civil rights remedy that allowed victims to sue perpetrators of
gender-motivated violence.13
Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court struck down the
civil rights remedy for lacking authority under the Commerce Clause and
the 14th Amendment, committed attorneys and activists could revive the
civil rights remedy through the 13th Amendment. 14 Even though the 13th
Amendment has traditionally been reserved for conventional notions of
slavery, congressional power of the 13th Amendment can be extended to
grant women a remedy from their own enslaved conditions of domestic
violence.
Overall, this note will address the possibility of restoring the civil
rights remedy in the Violence Against Women Act through Congress's
power under the 13th Amendment. Part II will examine the creation of the
Violence Against Women Act and specifically examine the addition and
eventual elimination of the civil rights remedy after United States v.
Morrison. Part III will address the development of the 13th Amendment.
Specifically, I will focus on how the 13th Amendment can be used to
abolish both slavery and the "badges and incidents" of slavery. I will also
examine historically how Congress and the courts viewed extending the
13th Amendment beyond the labor realm and race. In Part IV, I argue that
domestic violence as a form of gender-motivated violence falls under the
purview of the 13th Amendment, thus providing for reinvigoration of the
civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act. I analogize the
mechanisms used by abusers in modem manifestations of domestic
violence to antebellum slavery.' 5 I also address arguments unique to black
12. Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the
Use andAbuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 64-66 (2002).
13. Violence Against Women Act, Civil Rights for Women, tit. 4, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, §§ 40301-40304, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified by 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)), invalidated
by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
14. While the 13th Amendment is still rarely invoked today, it has become
increasingly more common since the Supreme Court began narrowly construing Congress's
authority to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment.
Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights and the Thirteenth
Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 349 (2004); see also Kimel v. Fla. Board of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000) (holding that Congress does not have power to enact the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act under § 5 of the 14th Amendment); and City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (holding that Congress lacked authority to pass the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act under § 5 of the 14th Amendment).
15. Still, one could analogize other forms of slavery to domestic violence, though
this is outside the scope of this note. Several scholars have published articles and books on
slavery in other contexts. See e.g. Maria L. Ontiveros, Immigrant Workers' Rights in a Post-
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women in relation to the analogy of domestic violence to antebellum
slavery.
By enacting the VAWA, Congress recognized that women's treatment
in the legal system left much to be desired, especially in relation to gender-
motivated violence. 16 The VAWA specifically aimed to address gender-
motivated violence. 17  For this reason, this note will examine domestic
violence as a legal argument from the lens of domestic violence as gender-
motivated violence.18 By no means does this note intend to minimize the
very real experiences of those individuals who experience domestic
violence that may not be gender-motivated (i.e., violence by women against
men and domestic violence between same-sex partners). 19 However,
because the VAWA does not overtly apply to such types of domestic
violence, this note is focused on domestic violence perpetuated by men
against women.
20
Hoffman World - Organizing Around the Thirteenth Amendment, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
651 (2004); Mary Ross Hendriks, Modern Slavery and the Production of Consumer Goods
in a Global Economy: Consumer Choice - Not Law - Will Trigger the Next Diaspora, 20
T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 431 (2003); and Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth
Amendment: Modern Slavery and a Reconstructed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 981 (2002-2003).
16. See Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality,
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1024-45 (2002) (examining the
VAWA within the realm of sex discrimination jurisprudence).
17. Id.
18. Some scholars argue that because of sex-role stereotyping, the very fact of being
a woman automatically creates a situation of powerlessness for women. See e.g., LENORE E.
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 42-54 (Harper & Row 1980); Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994: A Promise Waiting to be Fulfilled: The Civil
Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: Legislative History, Policy Implications
& Litigation Strategy, A Panel Discussion Sponsored by the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, September 14, 1995, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 427, 431 (1996). This notion
demonstrates the importance of recognizing gender-motivated violence. See id.
19. For articles analyzing domestic violence against men, see e.g. Alexander
Detschelt, Recognizing Domestic Violence Directed Towards Men: Overcoming Societal
Perceptions, Conducting Accurate Studies, and Enacting Responsible Legislation, 12 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 249 (2002-2003) and Melody M. Crick, Comment, Access Denied: The
Problem of Abused Men in Washington, 27 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1035 (2003-2004). For
articles analyzing domestic violence by same-sex partners, see e.g. Mamie J. Franklin,
Comment, The Closet Becomes Darker for the Abused: A Perspective on Lesbian Partner
Abuse, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 299 (2002-2003); Mary Beth D. Collins, Comment, Same-
Sex Domestic Violence: Addressing the Issues for the Proper Protection of Victims, 4 J.L.
Soc'Y 99 (2002-2003); and Krisana M. Hodges, Comment, Trouble in Paradise: Barriers to
Addressing Domestic Violence in Lesbian Relationships, 9 LAW & SEXUALITY: REV.
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 311 (1999-2000).
20. Although, arguments can be made that all forms of domestic violence have
foundations in some form of gender stratification and stereotypes of gender roles.
Nevertheless, this particular topic is an entire note within itself, so while I recognize that
battering between lesbian partners, for example, may have roots in misplaced gender roles,
my note focuses on developing a legal argument based on what Congress has already
recognized as gender-motivated violence.
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II. THE BIRTH OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
Congress exercised much of its power to pass the Violence Against
Women Act, including its power to create a civil rights remedy, through the
Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 21 Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has power "[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes. ''22 Congress found a connection between violence
against women and interstate commerce. Specifically, Congress found that
violence has prevented women from contributing to the national economy
on an equal footing with men because victims are less likely to leave their
homes and are more likely to spend money on medical treatment, thus
diminishing their ability to participate in interstate commerce.23 This
connection provided Congress with a justification for enacting the VAWA
under the Commerce Clause.24
Congress also exerted its power under the Equal Protection Clause of
the 14th Amendment. Under the Equal Protection Clause, "[n]o State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws., 26 Under §5 of the 14th Amendment, "Congress shall have the
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article. ,
27
In acknowledging the stark reality of gender-motivated violence, the
VAWA noted that the criminal justice system has frequently denied female
victims of violence their right to equal protection of the laws.28 Biased
implementation of state laws has failed to protect women and continually
has deprived them of their full citizenship rights.29 The failure of police to
effectively respond to the calls of domestic violence victims is a form of
sex discrimination that Congress aimed to address.3 ° In fact, Congress
recognized that "from the initial report to the police through prosecution,
21. Pub. L. No. 103-322, supra note 9.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
23. Shargel, supra note 11, at 1850.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. Id. Plaintiffs who challenge the constitutionality of state conduct or legislation
because of discrimination on the basis of gender must first establish a prima facie case of
gender discrimination. See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1530 (1984)
(holding that the plaintiff established a cause of action against the City of Torrington and
Torrington police officers because the defendants had adopted a practice of not responding
to domestic violence against women). Then, the burden shifts to the state to assert that its
practices meet the test applied in gender cases: the activity must be substantially related to
an important government interest. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
28. Shargel, supra note 11, at 1850.
29. Id.
30. Julie Goldscheid, Advancing Equality in Domestic Violence Reform, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 417, 419 (2003).
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trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently
and less seriously than other crimes. Several professors summarized
Congress's findings regarding violence against women as the following:
(a) Historically and currently, states have condoned violence
against women;
(b) states have failed to provide women adequate protection
against gender-motivated violence;
(c) the legacy and continuing pattern of state policy and practice
remain a cause of the failure to prevent violence directed at
women; and
(d) state law enforcement and courts continue to fail to ensure
women's right to equal protection of the laws against physical
violence from either state or private actors.32
Ultimately, the VAWA signified public recognition that victims of
gender-motivated violence were being treated unequally under the law in
violation of their 14th Amendment rights.
A. DAWN FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY
Through the VAWA, Congress created a federal civil rights remedy for
victims of gender-motivated violence. 33 This provision was placed under a
section titled "Civil Rights for Women."34  Congress defined "violent
crime" as any act that would constitute a federal or state felony despite
whether the offense would have actually resulted in criminal charges,
prosecution, or conviction.35 Both public and private actors were liable to
the victim for potential compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
injunctive and declaratory relief.36 The civil rights remedy connected
gender-based violence to other types of hate crime but still distinguished
this remedy from other torts.
37
31. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 42 (1993).
32. Brief of Amici Law Professors Filed Pursuant to Rule 29 of Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure in Support of the Constitutionality of the Violence Against Women Act
at 8-10, Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 169 F.3d 820 (4th
Cir. 1999) (Nos. 96-1814 CA-95-1358-R; 96-2316 CA-95-1358-R).
33. Violence Against Women Act, Civil Rights for Women, tit. 4, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, §§ 40301-40304 108 Stat. 1796 (codified by 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)), invalidated by
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
34. Id,
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Goldscheid, supra note 30, at 419.
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The VAWA's civil rights remedy served an important societal function
of addressing violence against women.38 Moreover, the civil rights remedy
force her perpetrator to testify and be cross-examined on the witness stand
whereas in criminal cases the perpetrator has the choice to invoke his Fifth
Amendment right to prevent self-incrimination by avoiding testifying on
the stand.39 The civil rights remedy also financially compensated a victim
for her trauma in addition to offering incarceration to the convicted.n
Additionally, the civil rights remedy provided an alternative remedy for
a distinct harm not recognized by traditional state interests n.4  This was
particularly useful when the state refused to prosecute a victim's case.42
The VAWA's civil rights provision also provided a remedy in federal court
when other federal legislation failed to provide victims of gender-motivated
violence with a means of redress. For example, two federal statutes exist
that prohibit bias crimes, but these statutes do not include crimes motivated
by gender.43 Moreover, other federal civil rights laws proved insufficient
to provide a remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act only bans discrimination in employment.44 Title IX
only bans gender discrimination in educational institutions.45 Congress
thus passed the VAWA's civil rights remedy to address the gaping hole in
legislation that failed to address the majority of domestic violence and rape
cases, which do not take place at work or at school. Still, Congress used
these previously passed civil rights statutes as a framework for the civil
46
rights provision.
B. DUSK FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY
While the civil rights provision has several important benefits, it also
possesses several problems. First, the assumption that a lawsuit is one of
the best solutions for victims of domestic violence and sexual assault is
38. Jennifer R. Hagan, Can We Lose the Battle and Still Win the War?: The Fight
Against Domestic Violence After the Death of Title X11 of the Violence Against Women Act,
50 DEPAUL L. REv. 919, 955 (2001).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Goldfarb, supra note 12, at 81. Traditional areas in which states provide
remedies include domestic relations, personal injury, and criminal proceedings under state
law. Id.
42. Hagan, supra note 38, at 955.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (2000); Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1994).
When Congress passed the VAWA, it also passed the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement
Act, which increases punishment for gender-motivated crimes. Pub. L. No. 103-322, at
280,003, 108 Stat. 2096 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994)). However, this Act does not
provide the same level of redress as the Hate Crimes statutes. See id
44. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e-17 (2005).
45. Education Amendments of 1972, tit. 9, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2005).
46. The phrases "because of gender" or "on the basis of gender" in 42 U.S.C. §
13981(d)(1) originated in Title VII. S. REP. No. 103-138, at 52-53 (1993).
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riddled with class bias.47 This remedy is only useful against an individual
48perpetrator who has assets to recover. Perhaps, victims are less in need of
civil rights remedies than they are in need of lawyers who can effectively
negotiate criminal prosecutions that involve the victims; or money for child
care; or assistance in securing divorce, child support, or child custody; or
help in immigration proceedings.49 Still, despite its class bias the civil
rights remedy provides options to many women. While low-income
women might be unable to recover from indigent spouses, under the civil
rights remedy indigent women could still recover from the government
when a public actor perpetrated gender-motivated violence.50 While the
civil rights remedy may not provide the best solution for low-income
women against individual perpetrators, that drawback should not merit its
downfall. Recognizing that low-income women need options in addition to
the civil rights remedy is one step to ameliorating conditions of gender-
motivated violence. Creating a court system that is more accommodating
to low-income women will only strengthen the civil rights remedy for low-
income women who are victims of gender-motivated violence.
Second, the civil rights remedy invoked fears that Congress had
overreached its power and upset the balance of federalism between state
and national government. 51 However, the VAWA was designed to remedy
ongoing violations that pertain to specific federal interests and thus require
a federal civil rights remedy.52 For example, the VAWA aimed to ensure
that judges and police officers in rural Tennessee had resources and
training to respond just as quickly and appropriately to gender-motivated
violence as do judges and officers in urban New York. Such federal
interests necessitated a federal civil rights remedy.
Finally, the civil rights remedy encountered constitutional problems
stemming from the Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment. The
47. Wriggins, supra note 8, at 137-39; see also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1246 (1991) (writing that "[w]here systems of race, gender, and class
domination converge, as they do in the experiences of battered women of color, intervention
strategies based solely on the experiences of women who do not share the same class or race
backgrounds will be of limited help to women who because of race and class face different
obstacles.").
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Violence Against Women Act, Civil Rights for Women, tit. 4, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, §§ 40301-40304, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified by 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)), invalidated
by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
51. Louis J. Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism Whether They Want It or
Not": The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Federal Civil Rights
Legislation after United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 926-27 (2001).
52. Julie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and The Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism,
86 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 129 (2000).
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Morrison Court eventually held that the civil rights provision was
unconstitutional under both of these sections of the Constitution. 53  In
essence, the Court invalidated two dominant sources of power that
Congress could exercise. However, Congress still has other avenues of
power to reinstate a private cause of action for violence against women.
The 13th Amendment provides another source of power for Congress.
Many scholars have shied away from exploring the possibility of this
amendment as a way in which Congress could reinvigorate the civil rights
remedy of the VAWA,54 yet this remains a viable alternative source of
authority. The remaining portions of this note will examine the 13th
Amendment as a possible source of Congressional power to reinstate
another version of the civil rights remedy in the Violence Against Women
Act.
III. THE BEGINNING OF THE END
TO ANTEBELLUM SLAVERY
A. THE POWER OF THE 13TH AMENDMENT
Section one of the 13th Amendment abolishes slavery:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.55
Section two of the 13th Amendment provides Congress with power to
enforce this amendment; 56 although, Congress only retains remedial power
to enforce the 13th Amendment. 57  Thus, section two of the 13th
53. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. Prior to Morrison, out of approximately 24 cases that
decided the constitutionality of the civil rights provision, only three courts held that
Congress lacked authority to pass the civil rights remedy: Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst.
& State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (affd by United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (alleging gang rape by students in university residence hall); Bergeron
v. Bergeron, 48 F. Supp. 2d 628 (M.D. La. 1999) (alleging battery, assault, and attempted
rape by husband); and Santiago v. Alonso, 96 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.P.R. 2000) (alleging rape,
domestic violence, and attempted homicide).
54. Sally F. Goldfarb, "No Civilized Justice of System": The Fate of the Violence
Against Women Act, 102 W. VA. L. REv. 499, 535-37 (2000); Hagan, supra note 38, at 965-
68; contra Marcellene Elizabeth Heam, Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the
Violence Against Women Act, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1097 (1998). However, Heam's article
presents a 13th Amendment analysis before United States v. Morrison.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this article
by appropriate legislation.").
57. Congress's enforcement must be congruent with the constitutional injury
remedied and proportional to that injury. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520,
532 (1997); and Kimel v. Fla. Bd of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86 (2000).
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Amendment provides a source of Congressional authority to create a cause
of action for private discrimination. 8 This is particularly important after
the United States Supreme Court invalidated congressional authority to
enact the civil rights remedy of the VAWA under the Commerce Clause
and the 14th Amendment. 59 Additionally, the 13th Amendment does not
require state action as does the 14th Amendment.60 It thus prohibits slavery
by the government and individuals. For this reason, the 13th Amendment
provides hope for reinvigoration of the VAWA's civil rights remedy.
In addition to abolishing slavery, the 13th Amendment also gives
Congress the authority to legislate against the "badges and incidents" of
slavery. 6' Nevertheless, in 1883 the Civil Rights Cases quashed Congress's
power to enact a particular piece of civil rights legislation under the 13th
Amendment.62 Specifically, the Civil Rights Cases invalidated sections one
and two of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,63 which provided for criminal and
civil penalties for race-based discriminatory treatment at public
transportation, accommodations, and places of amusement. The Court
ultimately invalidated the legislation when it held that Congress had
overstepped its authority to enact legislation to abolish all "badges and
incidents" of slavery. 64  The Court stated that "it would be running the
slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of [private]
discrimination., 65 In his dissent, Justice Harlan wrote that the majority's
opinion was "narrow and artificial" and antithetical to the "substance and
58. Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465
(1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403 (1993);
Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment
Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1359 (1992); Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond
Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE
J.L. & FEMrNISM 207 (1992); Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as
Prerogative andPrivacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
59. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619, 627.
60. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13, 20 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases
consisted of five consolidated cases. Id. at 4-5. Four of the five cases involved criminal
prosecutions where two of the defendants allegedly denied blacks access to an inn or hotel.
One defendant was charged for banning an African American from the dress circle of a San
Francisco theater. The fourth defendant was charged with prohibiting an African American
access to an opera house in New York. Id The fifth case involved a civil case brought
against a railroad company whose conductor banned a black woman from riding in the
ladies' car. Id.
61. Id. at 20 (stating that the 13th Amendment "clothes Congress with power to pass
all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States."). The phrase "badges and incidents of slavery" derived from the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114,
§ 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2005)).
Hearn, supra note 51, at 1142.
62. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25-26.
63. Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
64. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20-21.
65. Id. at 24.
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spirit" of the 13th Amendment.66 Justice Harlan continued to state that the
13th Amendment's guarantee of "freedom necessarily involved immunity
from, and protection against, all discrimination against them, because of
their race, in respect of such civil rights as belong to freemen of other
races." 67
From 1883 to 1968, Congress's power to enact legislation under the
13th Amendment laid dormant. However, in 1968, in the landmark case of
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the United States Court effectively overruled
parts of the draconian Civil Rights Cases and held that the 13th
Amendment extends beyond uncompensated, forced labor.68 The Jones
Court determined that the 13th Amendment grants Congress power to enact
legislation that is rationally related to ending any remaining "badges and
incidents" of servitude.69 Supreme Court cases that have followed Jones
have upheld congressional authority to prohibit private racial
discrimination pursuant to section two of the 13th Amendment.70 This
more recent line of cases has weakened the once potent power of the Civil
Rights Cases to dilute Congressional authority under the 13th Amendment.
Jones has since reopened the possibility for Congress to invoke their
authority to legislate against the "badges and incidents" of slavery and thus
provide a civil rights remedy for gender-motivated violence.
66. Id. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440-41 (1968). While Jones held
that Congress's enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was an exercise of their
"necessary and proper" means of authority, id. at 438-44, the majority opinion expressly
avoided addressing whether the 13th Amendment provides congressional authority to
prevent discrimination in places of public accommodation because the Civil Rights Act of
1964 had made this issue moot. Id. at 440-41, 441 n.78.
69. Id. at 440-41.
70. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 435-40 (1973)
(holding unconstitutional a private swimming pool's denial of access to African Americans
who had purchased property with the expectation that they could join the recreation center
nearby); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-61 (1975) (extending
the applicability of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to allow recovery for discriminatory conduct from a
private employer); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 163 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C. §
1981 prohibits private schools from refusing to enroll students based on their race);
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
applies only to racial discrimination perpetuated during the contract formation process but
not post-formation discrimination). Nevertheless, Congress superceded Patterson by
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2005)). Jones, Runyon, and Johnson illustrate that
Congress has broad power to enact laws rationally designed to end any lingering incidents
and badges of slavery. Tsesis, supra note 14, at 344.
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B. THE ABOLITION OF ANTEBELLUM SLAVERY BEYOND LABOR
RELATIONS
Traditionally, the 13th Amendment has been conceptualized as
applying to slavery pertaining to labor relations. However, research
regarding legislative intent at the time Congress passed the 13th
Amendment indicates that Congress did not intend to ban only involuntary
labor relationships when it forbade slavery.71
Congress recognized that slavery did not exist in an isolated labor
domain. In fact, it frequently compared slavery to polygamy.72 Republican
Senator Charles Sumner succinctly reiterated Congress's conceptualization
of this analogy in his notorious speech before the Senate on the admission
of Kansas to the Union:
By license of Polygamy, one man may have many wives, all bound
to him by marriage-tie, and in other respects protected by law. By
license of Slavery, a whole race is delivered over to prostitution
and concubinage, without the protection of any law. Surely, Sir, is
not Slavery barbarous?
7 3
Senator Sumner's comment illustrates Congress's acknowledgement
that slavery as a peculiar institution 74 embodied more than mere labor
relations. By recognizing slavery as extending beyond the labor realm,
Congress refused to ignore the blatant interconnection between the private
and public spheres for slaves, in particular for slave women.
Slavery for women often centered around childbearing and producing
more slaves for the slave owner's plantation.75 Also, slavery for women
often involved sexualized beatings. 76 Infertile female slaves frequently
were subjected to harsher penalties and physical abuse because they failed
to fulfill the slave owner's perceptions of their role as female slaves.77
Many female slaves were in fact infertile or suffered numerous
miscarriages, which some scholars have attributed to the sparse and grossly
inadequate diets and the intense labor that the slaves endured.78
71. Amar & Widawsky, supra note 58, at 1366-68.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1366 (quoting Senator Charles Sumner, The Barbarism of Slavery, Speech
in the United States Senate on the Admission of Kansas as a Free State (June 4, 1860), in 5
THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 1, 21 (1872)).
74. Prior to the Civil War, both Northerners and Southerners often referred to slavery
as a "peculiar institution." Paul Finkelman, Thomas R.R. Cobb and the Law of Negro
Slavery, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 75, 76 (1999).
75. Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The
Thirteenth Amendment's Role in the Struggle for Reproductive Rights, 3 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 401, 410-11 (2000).
76. Id. at 412-13; bell hooks, AIN'T I A WOMAN 24-27 (South End Press 1981).
77. Bridgewater, supra note 75, at 413.
78. HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-
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Nevertheless, slave owners perceived infertility as an act of unwillingness
and insubordination toward the slave owner's wishes, thus resulting in
many slave owners violently punishing their infertile female slaves. Slave
owners frequently resold infertile female slaves to unsuspecting buyers
who in turn retaliated against the slave and punished her for her
infertility.
79
Congress recognized this "private" dimension of slavery by
acknowledging that slave masters had sexual relations (which usually
meant rape) with slave women.80 They fathered more slaves through these
rapes. Slavery did not merely exist based on slave families reproducing
more slaves for the plantation. The slave master also had control over the
growth of his slave population by raping slave women and forcing them to
bear children that would work in his fields or his home. When Congress
eradicated slavery through the 13th Amendment, it not only abolished
slavery through physical labor, it abolished sexual slavery that existed
when the slave master forced himself on his female slaves.81 Thus, when
Congress ended slavery through the 13th Amendment, it theoretically
reconstructed the private sphere and recognized that slavery exists beyond
labor relations.82
C. EXTENDING THE 13TH AMENDMENT BEYOND RACE
No one would deny that Congress passed the 13th Amendment for the
purposes of eradicating slavery of blacks in the United States. However,
early interpretations of the 13th Amendment hinted at its power to reach
beyond cases of race.83 The very broad language of the 13th Amendment
lends credence to the interpretation that Congress intended to eliminate all
forms of slavery in the United States.
84
So far, courts have expressly interpreted statutes enacted under the 13th
Amendment to apply only to race. For example, in Bobo v. ITT,
Continental Baking Co.,85 the Fifth Circuit found that 42 U.S.C. § 198186
1925, 80 (Vintage Books 1976).
79. Bridgewater, supra note 75, at 412-14.
80. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 58, at 1366-67.
81. See Amar, Women and the Constitution, supra note 58, at 467.
82. See Amar & Widawsky, supra note 58, at 1368.
83. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1972) (stating that "undoubtedly
while negro slavery alone was in the mind of Congress which proposed the thirteenth
article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter.").
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (stating that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
This broad language suggests that Congress did not specifically limit this slavery to race.
85. Bobo v. ITT, Cont'l Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 344 (Former 5th Cir. 1981).
86. Section 1981 guarantees equal rights to make and enforce contracts. 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (2005).
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only applied to racial discrimination.87 Congress was not ignorant of this
possible interpretation. In fact, immediately after Congress passed the 13th
Amendment, some Congressmen feared that legislation enacted under the
13th Amendment would be deemed unconstitutional because its broad
language could include protection for individuals on a basis other than race.
For example, the broad language of the Civil Rights Act of 186688 incited
fear among several Congressmen, including Senator Cowen that it would
be ruled unconstitutional:
What is the fair construction of that amendment of the Constitution
abolishing slavery? ... What was the involuntary servitude
mentioned there? ... Was it the right the husband had to the
services of his wife? Nobody can pretend that [was] within the
purview of that amendment; nobody believes it. It was mentioned
as a matter of ridicule in some places ... that it did actually entitle
the wife to be paid for her own services, that they should not go to
the husband .... The true meaning and intent of that amendment
was simply to abolish negro slavery.89
Despite this narrow interpretation of the 13th Amendment, there is
nothing specific in the language of the amendment to limit Congress's
power to enact legislation only based on race.
In fact, court interpretations of some statutes enacted under the 13th
Amendment provide support for recognizing that the 13th Amendment
could apply to gender. One such statute is § 1985,90 which forbids
conspiracies to interfere with civil rights.9 1 In United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners, Local 610 v. Scott,92 four justices agreed that
§ 1985(3) covers gender discrimination. However, the case addressed
87. The Seventh Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2005) was a constitutional
enactment under the 13th Amendment in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International
Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
88. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (reenacted by Enforcement
Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1981-1982 (1987)).
89. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1784-85 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan).
Senator Cowan believed that African Americans who obtained "free" status before the Civil
War were not protected under the 13th Amendment. Id. at 1782.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2005).
91. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Court recognized that §
1985(3) created a private cause of action. It also recognized that one must show animus to
prevail under this statute. In comparison the VAWA creates a substantive gender-based
right to be free from sexual violence. However, § 1985(3) provides a private remedy for an
already existing right. See Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality
Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 8
(1996).
92. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 853 (1983) (5-4
decision) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joined by Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and O'Connor, J.)).
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animus against nonunion members, so the majority was not required to
discuss whether § 1985(3) coveres gender discrimination. In Great
American Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Novotny,93 the
appellate court found that women are a protected class under § 1985(3).
The Supreme Court reversed but on different grounds.94 It never reached
the issue of whether § 1985 applies to gender.95  Justice Powell's
concurrence said that § 1985 does not apply to gender.9 6 However, Justice
White's dissent said that § 1985 applies to gender discrimination. 97 In
1993, Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Souter emphasized that § 1985(3)
applies to gender-based discrimination. 98  The majority in Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic held that "women seeking abortions" is
not a protected class and thus discrimination against this class is not
synonymous to discrimination against women.99 Nevertheless, the larger
issue of whether or not § 1985(3) generally applies to gender has not been
resolved. The Court's willingness to consider the 13th Amendment's
application to gender is thus very much alive.
IV. SLAVERY AS A MODERN LEGAL ARGUMENT
TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Declaring domestic violence as a form of slavery is a controversial
position to take. The word slavery usually invokes images of an
antebellum South with whips, shackles, and other forms of torture. It is
often associated with one race or ethnic group subjugating another race or
ethnic group into forced labor. However, the word slavery itself embodies
a much broader notion of an institution of bondage.
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary1 °0 defines slavery as
(1) drudgery, toil;
(2) submission to a dominating influence; and
(3) (a) the state of a person who is a chattel of another (b) the
practice of slaveholding.
93. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1262 (3d Cir.
1978), vacated, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
94. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 381 (Powell, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 387, 389 n.6 (White, J., dissenting).
98. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 295-96 (1993)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 269.
100. MERRIAM WEBSTER's DICTIONARY 1171 (11 th ed. 2004).
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Black's Law Dictionary °10 defines slavery as
(e) a situation in which one person has absolute power over the
life, fortune, and liberty of another; and
(2) the practice of keeping individuals in such a state of bondage
or servitude.
Examining the oral histories and narratives of former slaves depicts
how slaves themselves viewed slavery as a broad institution of bondage.
The narrative of Adeline Cunningham, a slave in Texas, illustrates the
degree of power slave owners exerted over their slaves when slaves would
be beaten if they even entertained the thought of freedom.
Times we sneaks in de woods and prays de Lawd to make us free
and times one of de slaves got happy and made a noise dat dey
heered at de big house and den de overseer come and whip us
'cause we prayed de Lawd to set us free.' 0 2
Harriet A. Jacobs describes the type of dominating influence and power
her slave master exerted over her: "[H]e was my master. I was compelled
to live under the same roof with him .... He told me I was his property;
that I must be subject to his will in all things."'0 3
Situations involving domestic violence could fall under one or several
of these broad definitions of slavery. Domestic violence often involves one
person in a relationship exerting dominance over another. Instead of using
whips or chains, the batterer gains absolute power over his partner through
a constant flow of verbal abuse often coupled with actual incidents of
physical violence. Judy North describes how her batterer exerted
dominance and power over her through an "invisible whip:" "My mother
said, 'Judy, he has an invisible whip that he's just whipping you with all the
time.' I thought, you know, he has whipped me enough. I am not going to
allow him to whip me anymore."
Despite lacking an actual whip to abuse his partner, a batterer often
employs similar methods of and justifications for physical violence against
his partner as antebellum slave owners used for abusing slaves. William
Moore described such abuse against another slave: "She say Marse Tom
got mad at the cookin' and grabs her by the hair and drug her out the house
and grabs the saw off the tool bench and whips her.'" °4 Sara, a survivor of
101. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (8th ed. 2004).
102. UNCHAINED MEMORIES: READINGS FROM THE SLAVE NARRATIVES 110 (Bulfinch
Press ed., 2002).
103. Harriet A. Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, CLASSIC AFRICAN
AMERICAN WOMEN'S NARRATIVES 223 (William L. Andrews ed., Oxford U. Press 2003).
104. UNCHAINED MEMORIES, supra note 102, at 90.
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domestic violence depicts a similar experience:
One evening, my husband came home drunk and brought a friend
home with him. He demanded that I make dinner for them. When
I told him we did not have enough food, he hit me in the eye,
grabbed me by the neck, sat me down and put a gun to my neck.
He threatened to kill me if I did not cook for them. I cooked the
little food we had for the children and fed it to them.1 5
Both slave owners and spouses have used perceived inadequacies in
cooking to justify abuse.
Notwithstanding some similarities in mechanisms and justifications for
violence, differences do exist in some of the actual tools of torture used by
slave owners versus more modem tools of torture against intimate partners
in domestic violence. Still, while some of the ways in which a batterer is
able to exert control over his partner are different than how an antebellum
slaveholder was able to control his slaves, the resulting relationship is the
same. The slaveholder abused and intimidated his slaves into bondage.
Likewise, a batterer abuses and intimidates his partner into bondage. He
may not force her to work the land the same way as a slave in the
antebellum South, but she is enslaved to stay with the batterer who often
exercises absolute power over her life, fortune, and liberty.
A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A FORM OF SLAVERY
Domestic violence can involve a multitude of mechanisms to
subordinate another person. As illustrated through the infamous Power and
Control Wheel below ("the Wheel"), 10 6 domestic violence can include the
use of physical and sexual violence, coercion and threats, intimidation,
emotional abuse, isolation, minimization, denial, blame, children, male
privilege, and economic abuse.
107
105. Lee J. Teran, Barriers to Protection at Home and Abroad: Mexican Victims of
Domestic Violence and the Violence Against Women Act, 17 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 58 n.277
(1999).
106. Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, Duluth, MN, http://www.duluth-
model.org/documents/PhyVio.pdf (last visited October 12, 2005).
107. The Power and Control Wheel reflects only some ways that batterers try to
control the person they are abusing. For example, using language skills and immigration
status, which are not represented on the Wheel, are other mechanisms that batterers employ.
See Karin Wang, Comment, Battered Asian American Women: Community Responses from
the Battered Women's Movement and the Asian American Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151,
162-67 (1996).
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As demonstrated in the Wheel, perpetrators of domestic violence often
use coercion by controlling virtually every aspect of the victim's life-from
the food she eats, to the clothes she wears, to what she does in her free
time. 10 8 Rape is also a common method to exert domination over a victim
of domestic violence. 10 9 Moreover, the Wheel illustrates how children can
become pawns in a game of intimidation for the abuser."0
Antebellum slavery shared many of these forms of abuse. It often
involved the use of intimidation, emotional abuse, blaming the slave for
any problems on the plantation, separating children from slave parents, and
108. See Mary Ann Dutton & Catherine L. Waltz, Domestic Violence:
Understanding Why It Happens and How to Recognize It, 17 WTR FAM. ADVOC. 14, 15-16
(1995).
109. See Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Their Children: Lessons From One
Woman's Story, 35 Hous. L. REv. 29, 40 (1998).
110. See id. at 49-62 (detailing the numerous ploys relating to their children that one
man used against his estranged wife after she left him).
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using male privilege, economic abuse, and coercion and threats against the
slave. The intersection of race and gender created a particular form of
abuse for slave women that is especially analogous to gender-motivated
violence, which the civil rights remedy emphasized. Slave owners used
sexual violence to assert their power and control over their female slaves.'
Slave owners intentionally separated children from their mothers as a
means of destroying familial relationships and the spirit of a female slave
who just bore life into this world and had no control over seeing her child
bloom into adulthood. 12 While differences between slavery and domestic
violence cannot be overlooked, 1 3 domestic violence perpetrators employ
similar intimidation tactics and violence as slave owners involved in the
peculiar institution of antebellum slavery.
1. Coercion
Coercion can be manifested in a variety of forms. An abuser can use
physical coercion and intimidation to force a victim to engage in activity
desired by the abuser. For example, an abuser could use physical threats
through the presence of a nearby weapon or through the presence of past
physical violence in order to get the victim to comply with the abuser's
wants."14  Psychological coercion is another common tool for abusers.
However, the courts have never accepted psychological coercion as a
component of slavery.
In United States v. Kozminski, two mentally handicapped men were
forced to work on a dairy farm without pay for 17 hours per day, seven
days a week, initially for $15 per week and then for no pay. 115 The case
defined "involuntary servitude" as "a condition of servitude in which the
victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical
restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law
or the legal process."116 The Court held that psychological coercion fails to
111. Melanie M. Lee, Defining the Agenda: A New Struggle for African-American
Women in the Fight for Reproductive Self-Determination, 6 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC
ANCESTRY L. J. 87, 91-93 (2000).
112. McConnell, supra note 58, at 220. Fear of separation from their children
resulted in female slaves escaping plantations less frequently than male slaves. DEBORAH
GRAY WHITE, AR'NT I A WOMAN: FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH , 70-75
(Norton ed. 1985).
113. See infra Part IV.B.2.
114. MARY ANN DUTTON, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE (U.S.) & NATL INST. OF MENTAL
HEALTH (U.S.), THE VALIDITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS
EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, VALIDITY OF "BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME" IN CRIMINAL
CASES INVOLVING BATTERED WOMEN 1-5 (Malcolm Gordon ed., U.S. Dep't of Justice 1996).
Abusers often use physical force, intimidation, and coercion to compel their victims to
engage in illegal activities for the abuser, including drug-related activity, fraud, theft, or
even violence against other people. Id.
115. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 934-35 (1988).
116. Id. at 952.
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meet the criteria for involuntary servitude.1 17 Justice Brennan disagreed
with this proposition.' He argued that psychological coercion can fall
under the purview of involuntary servitude.' 19 Justice Stevens agreed with
Justice Brennan. 120  Notwithstanding the fact that the United States
Supreme Court has refused to recognize psychological coercion as a form
of involuntary servitude, domestic violence perpetrators commonly employ
numerous other methods of coercion that would withstand 13th
Amendment scrutiny.
Some critics argue that because domestic violence often involves some
level of voluntariness in the relationship, it cannot be considered
involuntary servitude and thus is not subject to the 13th Amendment. It is
true that when one person engages in a relationship, the initial formation of
that relationship is usually voluntary. However, based on the complex
dynamics involved in domestic violence relationships, as illustrated in the
Wheel above, the relationship becomes more of a prison than a voluntary
commitment to another person.
A woman who has the physical capabilities can theoretically walk out
the door and away from her abuser forever. But, there are serious
impediments keeping her from leaving her abuser. First, she may lack the
financial resources to provide for her children or herself.121 If children are
involved, a victim of abuse may be less likely to leave. 122 Furthermore, the
most dangerous time for a victim of domestic violence is when she tries to
leave the relationship.1 23 In fact, 75% of spouse-on-spouse assaults occur
after separation or divorce. 124  Women who are abused become very
familiar with the cycle of violence and often are intuitively familiar with
this reality. In antebellum slavery, a slave could theoretically walk off the
plantation and away from her life of involuntary servitude forever. But,
like slave owners, perpetrators of domestic violence employ numerous
effective methods to compel women into one form of slavery and
involuntary servitude.
25
117. Id. at 949.
118. Id. at 961 (Brennan, J., concurring).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 969 (Stevens, J., concurring).
121. Dutton & Waltz, supra note 108, at 16.
122. Id.
123. Laurel Wheeler, Comment, Mandatory Family Mediation and Domestic
Violence, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 559, 562 (2002); see also Victoria L. Lutz & Cara E. Gady,
Domestic Violence and Parent Education: Necessary Measures and Logistics to Maximize
the Safety of Victims of Domestic Violence Attending Parent Education Programs, 42 FAM.
CT. REV. 363, 363 (2004) (stating that divorce can be the most dangerous time for the victim
trying to separate from her husband).
124. Lutz & Gady, supra note 123 (citing Nat'l Domestic Violence Hotline,
Domestic Violence. Information, Nat'l Statistics, available at http://www.ndvh.org (last
visited June 23, 2005)).
125. See United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that "a
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2. More than Mere Money: Expanding Traditional Notions of Slavery in
the Labor Context to Fit into a Modem Legal Framework
Antebellum slavery existed beyond the labor realm. It also pervaded
the private sphere when slave owners raped female slaves to exert their
domination over them and to produce a steady supply of more slaves.
126
Congressmen recognized that slavery extended to the private realm when
they passed the 13th Amendment.1
27
Likewise, domestic violence is a form of slavery that exists in the
private sphere. It consists of the perpetrator exerting power and control
over the victim. Perpetrators of domestic violence often use rape and other
methods of sexual intimidation to force their victims into subordinated
positions. 128 These methods allow the abuser to exert his domination over
his victim.1
29
Even if one refuses to accept the notion that slavery extends to the
private sphere, a strong argument exists that domestic violence still
constitutes slavery or involuntary servitude in the labor context.
30
Domestic labor produces wealth for the household in a manner that cannot
be calculated on income tax forms. Domestic labor is not a commodity to
be sold on the open market. However, its value cannot be diminished
merely because the person performing the work is not earning wages
through her work or because she is "voluntarily" choosing to work in the
home instead of outside the home.' 31 Despite not earning actual money, the
person performing domestic labor prevents the household from incurring
outside costs of childcare or other assistance.
32
When a person is involved in a relationship laced with domestic
violence, this unpaid labor may not be so "voluntary."' 33  Because the
defendant is guilty of holding a person to involuntary servitude if the defendant has placed
[the victim] in such fear of physical harm that the victim is afraid to leave, regardless of the
victim's opportunities for escape.").
126. See supra Part III.B.
127. Id.; See generally Amar & Widawsky, supra note 58.
128. Waits, supra note 109, at 40.
129. See id.
130. See Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91
Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 17 (1996).
131. Id. at 25-27.
132. Id. at 11.
133. In Bernel v. United States, 241 F. 339, 341 (5th Cir. 1917), the court examined
the involuntary nature of domestic labor when a domestic worker is coerced into the
arrangement in order to pay off a debt. The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that a female
domestic laborer forced to perform housework without pay in order to pay off a debt was
considered unlawful peonage. Id. at 342. See also Pierce v. United States, 146 F.2d 84, 86
(5th Cir. 1944) (holding that rape is involuntary servitude). See also Doe v. Doe, 929 F.
Supp. 608, 610 (D.Conn. 1996). In Doe, the plaintiff alleged that her husband forced her "to
be a 'slave' and perform all manual labor, including maintaining and laying out clothes for
his numerous dates with many girlfriends and mistresses." Id. at 610. Ultimately, the court
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perpetrator is often very skilled at using intimidation and coercion, among
other elements from the Wheel, he can easily create a situation where his
partner feels compelled to engage in whatever activity he desires. In fact,
one of the elements of the Wheel is economic abuse, which includes
preventing the abused from obtaining or maintaining a job. 134 If the abuser
wants the victim to stay at home and engage in unpaid labor there, she may
feel that she has no other choice and that her voice is silenced. Perpetrators
of domestic violence often become masters at producing powerful ploys of
persuasion that the only adequate action is what the perpetrator desires.
Thus, abusers' sly schemes of subordination create enslaved conditions for
many women of domestic violence. Just like an antebellum slave who
performed labor with no compensation, a woman confined by domestic
violence often performs domestic labor with no compensation.
B. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A BADGE AND INCIDENT OF NINETEENTH
CENTURY SLAVERY/INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE IN COMMON LAW
MARRIAGES
As discussed above, 135 the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
the 13th Amendment to prohibit "badges and incidents" of slavery and
involuntary servitude in addition to the slavery itself 1 36 In addition to the
argument that domestic violence itself is a form of slavery or involuntary
servitude, modem-day domestic violence also exists as an incident of 19th
century slavery in common law marriage.
1. Women as Property: Remnants from the 19th Century
Historically, the common law considered women to be property of
men, specifically property of their fathers until they later married and
became property of their husbands.1 37 In fact, after a woman got married,
denied the husband's motion to dismiss his wife's complaint against him seeking damages
under the VAWA for his alleged deprivation of her federal right to be free from gender-
based violence. Id. at 617. While this case was decided before United States v. Morrison, it
validates the experiences of women in relationships of abuse who do not feel like their
choices are very voluntary.
134. See Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, supra note 106.
135. See supra Part III.A.
136. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3, 20; Professor Burt Neubome argued at
the 1991 Senate Hearings that Congress possessed authority to pass the VAWA because
gender-motivated violence is a badge and incident of slavery or involuntary servitude.
Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary on S.15, 102d Cong. 80 (1991) (statement of Burt Neubome, Professor of Law,
New York University).
137. Kate McCabe, A Forum for Women's Voices: Mediation Through a Feminist
Jurisprudential Lens, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 459, 465 (2001). It is important to note that
slaves were not allowed to get married. Thus, this analysis applies to "free" women, or
women who were not designated as slaves.
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she and her husband were considered to be one person under the law.1 3 8
The wife's existence was consolidated into that of her husband's. 139
Because the woman was considered to be her husband's property, he was
entitled to engage in strict punishment if she disobeyed. 140 Women did not
gain recognition under the law as existing as separate beings from their
husbands until the Married Women's Property Acts, which gave women the
"right to sue, to be sued, to contract, and to own property."'14 1 Despite the
fact that these Acts were mostly passed before the 13th Amendment was
enacted, perceptions of women as pieces of property did not dissipate with
the Married Women's Property Acts.
During Congressional debates in passing the 13th Amendment,
Representative White stated the following:
The parent has the right to service of his child; he has a property in
the service of that child. A husband has a right of property in the
service of his wife; he has the right to the management of his
household affairs .... All of these rights rest upon the same basis
of a man's right of property in the service of slaves. 1
42
Statements like this by Representative Chilton White illustrate that not
everyone assented to re-conceptualizing women as separate beings from
their husbands.
Before and during the time that Congress passed the 13th Amendment,
many women who fought for the abolition of slavery also fought for
general women's rights. Thus, when Congress passed the 13th
Amendment, it was not oblivious to the argument that described 19th
century treatment of women as a form of slavery. During the Seneca Falls
Conference in 1848, participants in the Conference argued that husbands
stripped women of civil rights during marriage. John Dick reported the
following statements during the Convention:
138. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1294-96
(William Carey Jones ed. 1916) (1788).
139. Id.
140. Courts recognized that a husband could beat his wife with a rod or switch so
long as its circumference was no greater than the girth of the base of the man's right thumb.
Cheryl Ward Smith, "The Rule of Thumb," A Historical Perspective?, in DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE LAW 34 (Nancy K.D. Lemon ed., 2001).
141. In 1839, Mississippi became the first common law state to allow married
women to own a separate legal estate in property. Elizabeth Gaspar Brown, Comment,
Husband and Wife: Memorandum on the Mississippi Women's Law of 1839, 42 MICH. L.
REv. 1110, 1113-17 (1944). It is important to note that the impetus for pushing this Act did
not stem from gender egalitarian principles but on protecting property within farming
families once the daughters married, and the land was transferred outside the family. See
Inara K. Scott, A Window for Change: Conflicting Ideologies and Legal Reforms in Late
Nineteenth-Century Oregon, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 433, 441-45 (2001).
142. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d. Sess. 215 (1865) (statement of Rep. White).
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He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead. He
has taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she
earns .... In the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to
promise obedience to her husband, he becoming, to all intents and
purposes, her master - the law giving him power to deprive her of
her liberty, and to administer chastisement.1
43
The statements of John Dick were not particular to him. At the Tenth
National Women's Rights Convention in 1860, Elizabeth Cady Stanton
advocated divorce as an end to "legalized prostitution of coerced marital
intercourse and unwilling maternity."14
By the end of the Civil War, judges even began to associate acts of
domestic violence, some of which were allowed in 19th century common
law marriages, with slavery. Justice Pelham, an Alabama judge, wrote the
following in an 1871 domestic violence case:
The husband is therefore not justified or allowed by law to use
such a weapon, or any other .... The wife is not to be considered
as the husband's slave. And the privilege, ancient though it be, to
beat her with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or
kick her about the floor.., is not now acknowledged by our
law .... [I]n person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of
the law that the husband can invoke for himself.1 45
Justice Pelham's comments reflected similar ideas expressed at the
Seneca Falls Convention.
In light of comments like that from the Alabama judge above and
women and men who attended women's rights conventions, the 13th
Amendment was passed amidst at least some public discussion that equated
violence against women as a form of slavery. While Congressional
comments, like that of Representative White, 146 indicate a rejection of such
an interpretation, Congress did not pass the 13th Amendment in a vacuum
free of such ideas. The fact that Congress did recognize the 13th
Amendment's power to reshape the public/private dimension for former
143. REPORT OF THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION, Held at Seneca Falls, N.Y. July
19th and 20th, 1848, at 6 (Rochester, John Dick 1848).
144. Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights,
Women Suffrage, and the United States Constitution 1820-1878, in A LESS THAN PERFECT
UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 111 (Jules Lobel ed., 1988).
145. Siegel, supra note 58, at 2135 (quoting Fulgham v. State, 46 Ala. 143, 146-47
(1871)). However, Siegel warns that the judge who wrote this opinion was a former
slaveholder. Both the Plaintiff and the Defendant in this case were recently freed slaves, so
this case is probably less a representative of liberal views of gender relations than it is an
assertion of race privilege that white men could beat black women but black men had no
such entitlement. Siegel, supra note 58, at 2135-141.
146. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1
slaves, especially slave women, illustrates at least another interpretation of
the 13th Amendment as moving beyond a traditional conceptualization of
slavery.
More recently, the United States Supreme Court has drawn analogies
between chattel slavery and common law marriage. For example, in
Frontiero v. Richardson,147 Justice Brennan noted the similarities between
chattel slavery and common law marriage:
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the position of women
in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks
under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women
could hold office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names,
and married women traditionally were denied the legal capacity to
hold or convey property or to serve as legal guardians of their own
children.
1 48
In fact, battered women frequently become entrenched in relationships
that strip them of freedom 'of movement and mind.' 49 Today's modem
system of domestic violence has its roots in public laws that treated women
as property of their husbands, permitted husbands to use violence as a form
of discipline, and prevented women from engaging in the democratic
process. 150  The treatment of women in 19th century common-law
marriages exposes the roots of some gender-motivated violence and
highlights how the past treatment of women creates the present state of
involuntary servitude for women in relationships of domestic violence.
2. Specific Arguments on How 19th Century Common Law Marriage
Creates an Incidence of Slavery for Black Women
While women from many racial and ethnic backgrounds were
subjected to domestic violence in the nineteenth century, the violence
perpetuated against slave women during this era creates a different reality
for black women today. Slaves could not legally marry. 15 1 Slave women
were considered property of their slave masters instead of their husbands,
or life partners. 152 This helped create the modem social reality for many
black women that combines historical oppression based on race and sex.
While black women do not have the same "incidents" from 19th
century common law marriage as other women, black women still suffer
147. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
148. Id at 685.
149. Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights for Battered Women: Axiomatic and Ignored, 11
LAW & INEQ. 3, 44 (1992).
150. Id. at41.
151. ALAN GOVENAR, AFRICAN AMERICAN FRONTIERS: SLAVE NARRATIVES AND
ORAL HISTORIES 20 (2000).
152. See id.
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the "incidents" of nineteenth century slavery in other ways. Even though
female slaves were not considered property of husbands, they were still
considered to be someone else's property - that of their slave masters.
Moreover, accusations of sexual abuse by black men against white women
during and after slavery has created even more chains of slavery for black
women in relationships of domestic violence with black male partners.
Historical and contemporary memories of excessive punishment against
black men leads many black women to fear leaving their relationships of
abuse and prosecuting their abuser under the law.
While the incidents of 19th century common-law marriage may be
different for Black women, the imprint of involuntary servitude exists
nonetheless. And this imprint makes a civil rights remedy all the more
important for a black woman whose knowledge of the criminal justice
system may prevent her from exercising her legal right to be free from
violence.
V. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is undoubtedly a serious societal problem that
cannot be ignored. While state courts provide civil rights remedies for
victims of domestic violence, women also need validation of their wrongs
in the federal system. The Violence Against Women Act demonstrated
Congress's attempt to put domestic violence in the federal spotlight and
address specific federal concerns relating to domestic violence. However,
this victory was short-lived and less than 10 years later, the Court swiftly,
and arguably unjustifiably, invalidated the VAWA's civil rights remedy
under the Commerce Clause and the 14th Amendment in United States v.
Morrison. Nevertheless, the power of the civil rights remedy to help
victims of gender-motivated violence survives through the 13th
Amendment. Congress does have the power to legislate on behalf of
domestic violence because it exists as a form of slavery as well as a badge
and incident of involuntary servitude. It is time for Congress to unchain
the hearts of many women who survive enslavement and involuntary
servitude through their own experiences of domestic violence. The 13th
Amendment provides a valuable tool for Congress to accomplish this goal.
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